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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kim J. Day appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation
and executing his sentence for grand theft.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2008, Day pled guilty to grand theft and was given a suspended
fourteen-year sentence, with four years fixed, and placed on probation for ten
years. (R., pp.20-26, 38-41.) Over two years later, the state filed a report of
probation violation, alleging, inter alia, that Day had violated his probation by
being convicted in Bingham County for lewd conduct. (R., pp.46-47.) After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court found Day in violation of his probation
based on his recent conviction for lewd conduct. (R., pp.64-65; 8/15/11 Tr., p.3,
L.1 - p.1 0, L.10.) The court revoked Day's probation and imposed his original
unified sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.66-69; 8/29/11
Tr., p.1, L.1 - p.4, L.9.) Day timely appealed. (R., pp.70-72.)
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ISSUES
Day states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Day due process and
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with
the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Day's probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to
reduce Mr. Day's sentence sua sponte upon revoking
probation?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Day failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his due
process and equal protection rights by denying his motion to augment the
appellate record with an irrelevant transcript?

2.

Has Day failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing
discretion?

3.

Has Day failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
when it failed, sua sponte, to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35?

2

ARGUMENT
I.
Day Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With An Irrelevant Transcript
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Day filed a motion to augment with,

inter alia, an as-yet unprepared transcript of his original sentencing hearing held
on June 16, 2008. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule
And Statement In Support Thereof, filed December 21, 2011 (hereinafter
"Motion").) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Day's motion insofar as it sought
the preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of the June 16, 2008
sentencing transcript. (Order, filed January 17, 2012.)
Day now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with the requested transcript, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.515.) Day has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, however,
because he has failed to show that the requested transcript is even relevant to,
much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court has
jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free

3

review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Day Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentation
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient,
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d
229,234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148,438 P.2d 893
(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1 st Cir. 2002). To
show prejudice, Day "must present something more than gross speculation that
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the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeaL" Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605
(6 th Cir. 2002). Day has failed to carry this burden.
Day's appeal is timely only from the district court's August 30, 2011
Judgment and Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation revoking his
probation and ordering his original sentence executed. (See R., pp.67-69.) He
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with an as-yet
unprepared transcript of the June 16, 2008 sentencing hearing, but he has failed
to adequately explain, much less demonstrate, how a transcript of a hearing held
over three years before the decisions at issue in this case, and in relation to a
completely unrelated set of probation violation allegations, is necessary to decide
the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal.
Because the

as-yet unprepared

sentencing

transcript was

never

presented to the district court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings
at issue in this case, it was never part of the record before the district court and is
not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124
Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never
before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d
985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new
allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). Day, however, argues that "the
requested transcript is relevant to the issues addressed at the probation violation
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disposition hearing because the sentencing occurred before the probation
violation disposition hearing, and the district court could rely on its memory of
that hearing when it decided to revoke Mr. Day's probation." (Appe"ant's Brief,
pA.) Day further contends, citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28,218 P.3d
5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that "the June 16, 2008, sentencing hearing is relevant
because Idaho appellate courts review a" proceedings following sentencing
when

determining

whether

the

court

appropriately

revoked

probation."

(Appe"ant's Brief, p.11.)
The state recognizes the Idaho Court of Appeals' statement in Hanington,
148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 8, that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts
existing when the sentence was imposed as we" as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."

Contrary to Day's

assertions, however, Hanington does not stand for the proposition that a meritsbased review of a decision to revoke probation and order a sentence executed
requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of every
hearing over which the trial court presided.

To Jhe contrary, the law is we"

established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior hearings
and that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to

revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to transcription at public expense of
every hearing conducted before the date probation was finally revoked. 1 Mayer

1 In the recently decided (non-final, yet to be released for publication) decision
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2782599
*3 (Idaho App. 2012), relied upon here as instructive, the Court explained:
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v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not "required to expend its
funds unnecessarily" where "part or all of the stenographic transcript ... will not
be germane to consideration of the appeal" (citation and internal quotations
omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may
choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the
transcripts does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what
is unnecessary for adequate appellate review.").
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation, Day has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. Day
does not adequately explain how a transcript of the 2008 sentencing hearing is
necessary to decide the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on this
appeal.

Indeed, there is no evidence that the district court had the as-yet

unprepared transcript when it revoked Day's probation in August 2011, or that it
relied upon anything said at the sentencing hearing as a basis for its decision to
revoke Day's probation and order his sentence executed. Day's assertion in his
Morgan asserts that this Court's decision in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), requires a
review of the entire record of proceedings in the trial court up to and
including the revocation of probation. Morgan reads Hanington too
broadly. As stated in Hanington, in reviewing the propriety of a
probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily confine ourselves to only
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the
revocation of probation. Id. at 28, 218 P.3d at 8. However, that
does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation.
Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are
properly made part of the record on appeal.
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augmentation motion that the district court may have relied on its own
recollection of the prior proceedings in deciding whether to revoke his probation
(Motion, pp.3-4) is pure speculation and fails to show that the requested
transcript is necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate review under
the facts of this case. On appeal, Day similarly speculates that "the district court
could rely on its memory of that hearing when it decided to revoke [his]

probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.4 (emphasis added).)
Day has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that
what happened at the June 16, 2008 sentencing hearing was considered or
played any role in the court's decisions in August of 2011 to revoke Day's
probation and order his original sentence executed. Accordingly, Day has failed
to show that such transcript is necessary to complete an adequate record on this
appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Day claims that he
is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he "needs items to complete
a record on appeal" before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) He
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and
all indigent defendants) "with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's Brief, p.6; see
also p.5 ("[T]he only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent
defendant from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the
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transcript is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeaL").) No reading of Mayer
supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

~

at 190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

~

at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

~

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not "'germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances.'" Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

~

at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

~

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.
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~

at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

~

at 194-95. See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the revocation of Day's
probation and the order that his original sentence be executed.

The record

related to the district court's decisions is already complete because all of the
evidence considered by the district court at the revocation hearings is before the
appellate court. 2

It is Day's appellate burden to establish that the requested

transcript is necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the
orders revoking his probation and executing his original sentence.

The

augmentation he sought, however, was of a never before prepared transcript of a

See,!t.9.,., 8/1/11 Tr. (admit/deny hearing); 8/15/11 Tr. (evidentiary hearing);
8/29/11 Tr. (disposition hearing); R, pp.33-35 (minutes of 6/16/08 sentencing
hearing); R, pp.38-41 (Judgment of Conviction Suspended and Order of
Probation); R, pp.42-44 (Conditions of Probation); R, p.45 (Agreement of
Supervision); R., pp.46-59 (Report of Probation Violation and attachments); R.,
pp.62-63 (minutes of 8/15/11 probation violation evidentiary hearing); R, pp.6465 (Order and Decision); R, p.66 (minutes of 8/29/11 disposition hearing); R.,
pp.67-69 (Judgment and Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation);
Clerk's Ex., PSI (with attachments); Clerk's Ex., Judgment/Order of Commitment,
Bingham Co. No. CR-11-1046; Clerk's Ex., Psych. Eva!., Bingham Co. No. CR11-1046).
2
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hearing held over three years before the district court rendered the decisions at
issue in this case.

Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested

transcript (or anything contained therein) was before the district court in relation
to the 2011 probation revocation proceedings. Because Day failed to make a
showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts, there
is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district court is
in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Day has
failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 3 Strand, 137 Idaho at
463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Day has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment the
record on appeal with an irrelevant transcript denied him equal protection. Day
cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate records
because oftheir indigence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.6-10 (citing, 5h9.,., Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record that in any
way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Day's request for the
transcript solely because he is indigent.

In fact, Day's motion would have

properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcript. The
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a
As a component of his due process claim, Day argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-15.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Day has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's order revoking his probation and executing his sentence, there is
no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Day of
effective assistance of counsel on this appeal.
3
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ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.A.R. 30. Day's motion
to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon
all parties, of showing that the transcript was necessary or even helpful in
addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied
the motion to augment because Day failed to make a showing that any appellant
- indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as requested.
There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment would have been
granted had Day been paying for the requested transcript; the rule applies to all
parties, not just the indigent.
Day has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in any
way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that the
requested transcript is necessary to complete a record adequate to review any
issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

To the contrary, the

record amply demonstrates that Day's motion to augment with the requested
transcript was properly denied because he failed to show that the transcript was
necessary for adequate review of the district court's decisions to revoke Day's
probation and order his sentence executed. Because Day has failed to show his
due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by
the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief.
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II.
Day Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion

A.

Introduction
After finding that Day violated his probation because he was convicted on

a recent charge of lewd conduct, the district court revoked Day's probation and
ordered his sentence executed. 4

(R., pp.67-69.)

On appeal, Day does not

"contest the fact that he was convicted of lewd conduct."

(Appellant's Brief,

p.16.) Instead, Day argues that the district court "abused its discretion when it
revoked [his] probation because it did so based on the erroneous assumption
that it would have continuing jurisdiction and, therefore, the discretion to modify
that order in the event [his] conviction for lewd conduct is overturned on appeal,"
and that the district court's order revoking probation was based "in part" on "its
own misperception of the law." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)
Contrary to Day's argument, the district court's decision to revoke his
probation was based wholly upon the fact that he had recently been convicted of
lewd conduct - not because the court believed it could reconsider its revocation
order if his lewd conduct charge was overturned on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).
On May 27, 2011, Day was found guilty by a Bingham County jury of lewd
conduct, and was later sentenced to fifteen years (unified) with five years fixed.
(Clerk's Ex.; Bingham Co. No. CR-2011-1046, JudgmenUOrder of Commitment.)

4
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C.

Day Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Revoking His Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason . .lQ.
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
1

probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001).

Any cause satisfactory to the court,

which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation.

Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99.

Contrary to Day's

assertions on appeal, a review of the record shows that the district court revoked
Day's probation solely because of he had recently been convicted of lewd
conduct.
Day's recent conviction for lewd conduct not only served to violate his
probation in a most profound way, it also constituted a sufficient basis for
revoking his probation.

During the dispositional hearing, and before the court

made any comment about reconsidering its decision in the event Day's lewd
conduct conviction is overturned, the court made the following comments:

14

[THE COURT]: Previously had [sic] an admission of a conviction in
Bingham County for lewd and lascivious conduct. If I didn't then, I
am taking the position that the conviction is binding on this Court. I
think the defendant's collaterally stopped to deny that lewd and
lascivious conduct occurred in view of the Bingham County
conviction. So the Court does find a probation violation as to that
charge. I think we talked about that at the last hearing. I did look at
the judgment of conviction out of Bingham County as well as the
psychosexual evaluation, and that was interesting reading in view
of the conviction. So that's where I'm at.

THE COURT: The single violation on the probation violation report
related to lewd and lascivious conduct. And again, I do find a
violation - probation violation there. As indicated by the State, the
remaining allegations were withdrawn, so going [sic] forward with
disposition.
All right. Mr. Day, anything else you'd like to say before I
pronounce disposition on the probation violation?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Well, you raised an interesting question. In
view of the psychosexual evaluation, I guess I can understand why
there's an appeal going on in Bingham County. But having said
that, I don't - I don't know that I can discount - I'm really not in a
position to discount the conviction. I have to take the conviction at
face value.
And based upon that conviction, that probation violation,
obviously a very serious conviction, a very serious crime charged
and then the conviction. So based upon that, I am revoking
probation on this.
(8/29/11 Tr., p.1, L.7 - p.3, L.5 (emphasis added).) The concluding comments by
the district court show that its decision to revoke Day's probation was based
solely on the fact that Day was recently convicted of lewd conduct.
Although the district court went on to postulate that, if Day's lewd conduct
conviction were overruled, there would be grounds to reconsider the revocation
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of probation, the court concluded that Day's lewd conduct conviction and
sentence gave it little choice but to revoke his probation, explaining:
[B]ut as it stands right now, with the Bingham County conviction
and also the sentence out of Bingham County, I don't think it makes
sense for me to do anything other than revoke probation under the
circumstances. So that's where I'm at.

(8/29/11 Tr., p.3, LsA-11.)
The record demonstrates that the district court did not base its decision to
revoke Day's probation upon the notion that if his lewd conduct conviction were
overturned, the court could reconsider its revocation order.

That the court

believed it could do so played no part in its determination that Day's lewd
conduct conviction warranted revocation of his probation. Day has failed to show
any abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to revoke his probation.

III.
Day Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce His Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35
A.

Introduction
Day asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed, sua

sponte, to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 upon revoking probation.
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

The record, however, supports the district court's

decision to revoke probation and order the underlying sentence executed without
reduction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Upon revoking Day's probation, the district court had the authority,

pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying
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sentence imposed upon his conviction for grand theft.

I.C.R. 35; State v.

McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179 P.3d 360, 363 (Ct. App. 2008). The decision
of whether to do so was committed to the district court's discretion and, as such,
Day bears the burden on appeal of establishing that the district court abused its
discretion by not sua sponte reducing his sentence.

C.

kL.

Day Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce His Sentence Pursuant To Rule
35
Day asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed, sua

sponte, to reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.19-21.) Day has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
The state charged Day with grand theft for stealing money from his
employer. (R., pp.15-16.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Day
pled guilty to that charge, and the parties entered into a stipulation requiring them
to "jointly recommend" a sentence of "5 years determinate and 9 years
indeterminate, for a total of 14 years, all to be suspended," with ten years of
probation.

(R., pp.20-23, 25-26.)

The district court imposed a sentence of

fourteen years with only four years determinate - less than the sentence agreed
upon by both parties -- and placed Day on probation for ten years. (R., pp.7375.) After Day was on probation for about three years, the district court revoked
his probation because Day was convicted of lewd conduct in another county.
(R., pp.64-69.)
Day asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sua

sponte reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction in light of his mental
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health, support from family and friends, work ethic and employment history.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21.)

Additionally, he contends that his recent lewd

conduct conviction "should not be afforded significant aggravating weight
because is [sic] still pending on appeal and the conviction has been put into
serious doubt by the psychosexual evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.)
There are two reasons why Day's argument fails. First, Day stipulated to
receiving an even greater determinate sentence than he received and is
therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the sentence
on appeal. Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of Day's claims, he has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
A party is estopped under the doctrine of invited error from complaining
that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to, or
acquiesced in was error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80
(Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party
who "caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court" to take a
particular action from "later challenging that decision on appeaL" State v. Blake,
133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999).

This doctrine applies to

sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho
462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
Day stipulated to a unified sentence of fourteen years, with five years
fixed, as part of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement. (R, pp.20-23, 25-26.) The
district court accepted the agreement and imposed the same unified sentence,
but with only four years determinate.

(R, pp.73-75.)
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Because Day received

even a lesser determinate sentence than the one to which he agreed, he cannot
claim on appeal that it is excessive or that the district court abused its discretion
by declining to further reduce his sentence.

Day's claim of an abuse of

sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
Even if this Court considers the merits of Day's claim, he has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court
may order the original sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized
by Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27, 218 P.3d at 7, (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,326,834 P.2d 326,328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989».

A court's

decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover,
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing."
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing
court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28,218 P.3d at 8.
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Day pled guilty to grand theft for embezzling money from his employer, the
Farr Candy Company, from June, 2005 through July, 2007, which amounted to
over $40,000.

(R., pp.15-16, 20-23, 36-37.)

Although Day was placed on

probation in June of 2008, he was convicted of lewd conduct for fondling his
step-daughter's genital area while the two were in a hot tub, which conduct
began in 2007 and ended during the winter of 2008 - while he was on probation
in the current case. (Clerk's Ex., Psych. Eva I. , Bingham Co. No. CR-11-1046,
pp.1-2.)

Despite Day's contention that his Bingham County lewd conduct

"conviction has been put into serious doubt by the psychosexual evaluation,,5
(Appellant's Brief, p.21), the fact remains that he stands convicted of that
extremely serious crime.
5 Although the psychological evaluator concluded Day was a "low risk of sexual
offending in the future but at moderate risk of more general criminal recidivism"
(Clerk's Ex., Psych. Eval., Bingham Co. No. CR-11-1046, p.12 (emphasis
added», he based that assessment on being uncertain whether Day actually was
guilty of lewd conduct. (See id., p.14 ("If Mr. Day is indeed culpable of the sex
crime for which he was convicted in jury trial earlier this year . . .. ").) The
evaluator earlier stated that, assuming Day was culpable for lewd conduct, he
would be a moderate recidivism risk as both a general offender and a sex
offender, explaining:
Risk factors in Mr. Day's case for general criminal recidivism
include his clear history of impulsivity, poor problem solving skills,
and inability to maintain himself on community supervision without
engaging in a new crime. Additional factors include some negative
emotionality as reflected in his current state of depression, and his
apparent use of sexuality as a coping tool for managing unpleasant
emotions. His history of three Grand Theft convictions suggests a
lack of concern for others as well. Finally, Mr. Day's risk of general
criminal recidivism is increased by his subpar capacity for stability
in romantic relationships. I note that, while I speak of the foregoing
stable characteristics as resulting in moderate risk of general
criminal recidivism, this rating of moderate risk would also apply to
sex offender recidivism risk were Mr. Day indeed culpable of the
index sex crime.
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The district court's decision not to further reduce Day's sentence upon
revoking his probation was appropriate in light of the seriousness of his grand
theft offense, his criminal history of two prior convictions for grand theft (Clerk's
Ex., PSI, p.3), his ongoing disregard for the law as evidenced by his recent lewd
conduct conviction (as a persistent violator) (Clerk's Ex., Judgment/Order of
Commitment, Bingham Co. No. CR-11-1046), and the risk he continues to
present to the community (see n. 4, supra).
Day was given ample opportunity to prove that he could succeed on
probation. In review of the entire record, the district court's decision to revoke
Day's probation was reasonable in light of the nature of his underlying offense,
his criminal history, his recent lewd conduct conviction, and an unwillingness to
abide by the conditions of probation. Considering all those factors, Day was not
entitled to have the district court sua sponte reduce his sentence. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Day has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing
discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking Day's probation and executing his sentence.
DATED this 27th day of August, 2012.

C. McKINNEY
y Attorney General
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